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1. Introduction 
 
Starting from a Soviet-type mono-bank system in the late 1970s, the 
Chinese financial system has undergone fundamental market reforms 
over the past three decades. The pace of reforms has accelerated 
particularly since the early 1990s, amid the fast integration of the 
economy into the world market. Increasing liberalization, 
commercialization, and internationalization have been main aspects of the 
reforms. Nevertheless, to date, the Chinese financial system has remained 
a mixed system. Despite the general trend of market reforms, there still 
exist strong market-supplanting elements in the system, including 
discretionary government intervention, the predominance of state banks 
in the sector, and the behavioural inclination of the banks towards 
causing excessive fluctuations. 
From the perspective of the world mainstream doctrines of financial 
liberalization, a mixed system of this kind must entail serious 
inefficiency. Indeed, time and again, there have been comments from the 
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international media, Western government officials, and specialist 
economists arguing that Chinese finance is heading towards catastrophes. 
The reality, of course, is that catastrophes have never materialized. It is a 
paradox that, along with this seemingly dubious financial system, the 
Chinese economy has performed well in terms of macroeconomic 
stability and long-term development. And this performance has been 
achieved amid the continuous financial deepening of the economy, which 
indicates that the financial system did play an important role in the 
process of economic development. How, then, to assess this system? 
And, given the paradoxical experience thus far, what is its likely future 
direction of reforms? 
To answer these questions requires clarifying the precise 
mechanisms through which finance impacts the real economy. This, in 
turn, requires appropriately characterizing (or conceptualizing) the nature 
of the evolving Chinese financial system. The objective of this paper is to 
make an attempt in this direction, i.e. to provide a preliminary answer to 
the questions, in the form of a couple of theses that are based on both 
theoretical reasoning and empirical stylized facts. Our main approach is 
to broaden the field of vision by drawing on a range of alternative 
theories, alongside the mainstream doctrines. And our central proposition 
is the following. The Chinese financial system has continued to embody 
both commercial and developmental attributes. Seen in the light of the 
mainstream doctrines, certain important elements of the system might 
appear to be market imperfections, and might entail allocative 
inefficiency. But, from the perspective of the alternative theories, these 
elements could in fact be conducive to productive efficiency. There is 
thus a possible trade-off between the two types of efficiency, and, 
ultimately, the net effect of the system can only be an empirical issue. 
The actual experience appears to indicate that, hitherto, the productive 
efficiency gains from the Chinese financial system have more than 
compensated for the allocative efficiency losses. To fully assess the 
system requires ascertaining the conditions within which its net impact on 
economic development is positive and significant, and we also provide   Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience 269 
some pointers for further investigations.
1 
This paper is organized in four sections, of which this introduction is 
the first. Section two depicts the main trends of evolution of Chinese 
finance over the reform era. The purpose is to establish some important 
stylized facts concerning the structures and institutions of the sector, as 
well as its actual performance in terms of maintaining macroeconomic 
stability and promoting long-term economic development. Section three 
moves on to analyze and assess the working of this system, in relation to 
relevant theories and the body of applied studies on finance and economic 
development in China. Section four concludes the paper, focusing on the 
policy implications of our analysis and the broader importance of the 
Chinese experience. 
 
 
2. Stylized facts on finance and development in China 
 
The market reforms of the Chinese financial system since the late 
1970s have been mainly a process of increasing liberalization, 
commercialization, and internationalization (see Appendix, table 1). At 
the beginning of the reform era, there were no truly financial institutions 
to speak of. The sector as a whole was no more than part of the 
government apparatus, as the cashier of the Ministry of Finance, and 
operated under mandatory central planning. Subsequent liberalization 
                                                             
1 At the most general level, allocative efficiency refers to the allocation of the economy’s 
resources – at a particular point in time – in a way that yields the maximum level of 
(demand-satisfying) output, subject to the constraint of the existing technical conditions in 
production. An economic growth path that is based on allocative efficiency can be 
envisaged as a series of time-points at every one of which the economy allocate its 
resources to produce the maximum level of output subject to the technical conditions of 
that time-point. Productive efficiency, in contrast, refers to the allocation of resources in a 
way that promotes the increase in the output-to-input ratio. A growth path that is based on 
productive efficiency implies a process of continuous increases in the output-to-input 
ratio, i.e. technological progress and therefore productivity growth, although the economy 
might or might not be producing at the maximum possible level of output at every point in 
time. Lazonick (1990, especially chapter 5) provides the possibly most incisive exposition 
on the distinction between the two different concepts of efficiency. The ramifications of 
the distinction, concerning finance versus industry, and short-term versus long-term 
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up until the mid-1990s resulted in the formation of a multi-tier banking 
system, comprising of the central bank (the People’s Bank of China), 
the “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks (the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, the Construction Bank of China, the 
Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China), and a large number 
of national and regional banks of varied ownership types and non-bank 
financial institutions, together with the gradual development of the 
stock market and other financial activities. The commercialization of 
state-owned banks accelerated in the mid-1990s, following the 
establishment of three policy banks to take away the non-commercial 
activities of the “Big Four.” This commercialization process was 
basically completed in the period 1998-2003, when, in the face of the 
East Asian financial crisis, the Chinese government strove to 
recapitalize and restructure state-owned banks with a view of improving 
their asset quality. The “Big Four” were subsequently transformed into 
shareholding ownership and were allowed to list part of their shares in 
the domestic and overseas markets. Meanwhile, along with the 
liberalization of its structure and commercialization of its institutions, 
the Chinese banking sector has also become increasingly 
internationalized particularly since the admission of the country into the 
World Trade Organization in late 2001. By 2007, foreign banks were 
free to conduct all kinds of banking business in the country. This has 
largely reinforced competition in the sector. 
The Chinese financial system has thus far remained a mixed system, 
however. Today, there still exist strong market-supplanting elements in 
the system. These include discretionary government intervention, the 
predominance of state banks in the sector, and the behavioural inclination 
of the banks towards causing excessive fluctuations. All these are well 
known and, as a result, the Chinese financial system has been subject to 
contrasting assessments concerning its efficiency attributes. It is deemed 
intrinsically inefficient from the perspectives of the mainstream doctrines 
of financial liberalization, but is seen to contain useful developmental 
attributes in the lens of Post Keynesian theories of endogenous finance 
(see e.g. García-Herrero et al., 2006; and Yang, 2006; which both 
describe in details the reform of Chinese banks but with contrasting   Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience 271 
assessments). 
At the descriptive level, a salient feature of the Chinese financial 
system is indeed the predominance of state-owned or state-controlled 
banks. This is the case despite the progress in market reforms over the 
past three decades, i.e. the increasing commercialization and part-
privatization of these institutions and the liberalization of the sector as a 
whole. As is shown in table 1, in 2010 directly state-controlled banks – 
the “Big Four” plus the Bank of Communication (which is the fifth 
largest bank, majority-owned by state agents), state-owned policy banks, 
and the Postal Savings Bank – accounted for 55% of the total outstanding 
bank loans, and 61% of the total assets of the banking sector as a whole. 
A further share of up to 25% of outstanding loans, and 16% of assets, was 
accounted for by a variety of joint-stock banks, of which state institutions 
might own up to a half of the shares. And the banking sector has 
continued to account for a main part of Chinese finance. As can be 
inferred from figure 1, in 1995 bank loans accounted for 82% of the total 
sources of funds in the economy. By 2010 the ratio still remained at close 
to 60%. 
 
 
Table 1 – State banks’ total assets and total outstanding loans as shares 
of the banking sector respective figures (%) 
 
2000 2005 2010
Assets 68  61 
Loans 77  62  55 
Sources: China Finance Statistical Yearbook, various issues; People’s Bank of China, and China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, websites. 
Notes: State banks = state-controlled specialized commercial banks (i.e. Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Construction Bank of China) + Bank of 
Communications + state policy banks (i.e. State Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank 
of China, Export and Import Bank) + Postal Savings Bank. 
 
At the level of assessment, a paradoxical phenomenon that has to be 
taken seriously is that the Chinese financial system has actually done a 
reasonable job in terms of promoting financial deepening of the economy. 
Indeed, the importance of finance in the economy has expanded 272   PSL Quarterly Review 
enormously over the reform era. Figure 1 charts out the evolution of three 
key indicators: the broad money supply (M2), total outstanding bank 
loans, and stock market capitalization plus the total trading value of 
bonds, all expressed as ratios to the gross domestic product (GDP). These 
indicators clearly show a fast process of financial deepening and 
monetization of the economy. And the banks seem to have done well in 
this regard, as is particularly evident in its comparison with the banking 
sectors of other comparable developing economies. Measured by the 
standard indicator of domestic credit provided by banks (as a ratio to 
GDP), in 2009, the Chinese figure was 145%, which far exceeded that of 
India (69%), Russia (34%), Brazil (98%), and South Korea (112%). And 
the comparison had been basically the same ever since the mid-1990s, as 
is shown in table 2. Clearly, and to say the least, the fact that the sector 
(and Chinese finance as a whole) has been dominated by state banks does 
not hinder the process of financial deepening of the economy. 
 
Figure 1 – Money supply, total outstanding bank loans, and stock market 
capitalization and total trading value of bonds (as % of GDP) 
 
 
Sources:  China Statistical Yearbook and China Financial Yearbook, various issues. 
Note:    Y = GDP, M2 = broad money, C = Year-end outstanding bank loans (RMB only), T = stock 
market capitalization, B = trading value of bonds. 
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Table 2 – Domestic credit provided by banking sector (as % of GDP) 
 
1996 2000 2005 2009
China 93.3 119.7 134.3 145.2
India 45.7 53.0 58.4 69.4
Russia 27.8 24.7 22.1 33.8
Brazil 57.1 71.9 74.5 97.5
South Korea 56.9 79.5 91.4 112.4
Sources: World Development Indicators, accessed 21 May 2011. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Annual growth of gross fixed capital formation (K), and total 
outstanding bank loans (C) 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook and China Financial Yearbook, various issues. 
 
The specific form of financial deepening has also seemed to be 
conductive to promoting economic development. Although speculative 
bubbles have occurred from time to time over the reform era, bank credits 274   PSL Quarterly Review 
have been mostly channeled to productive investment. Figure 2, which 
charts out the nominal annual growth rates of total outstanding bank   
loans and gross fixed capital formation, broadly indicates that the banking 
sector has worked in a way that is supportive of capital accumulation and 
hence economic development. On the whole, the two curves representing 
the growth rates tend to move in tandem. This must be of importance in 
explaining the performance of fast economic growth and modest 
inflation, on average more than 9% and less than 5% per annum 
respectively, over the reform era – despite the tremendous pace of 
monetary expansion in the meantime. 
The judgement that the financial system, and the banks in particular, 
have significantly contributed to capital accumulation can be confirmed 
by some simple regression analyses. The regression models take the 
following forms: 
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where K is gross fixed capital formation, Y is GDP, C is year-end total 
outstanding bank loans, T is stock market capitalization, B is the total 
trading value of bonds, and the subscript t indicates the year of the data 
series. It can be verified that the 1978-2010 time series of annual data of all 
these variables are integrated of order one, i.e. I (1), and in both equations 
(1) and (2) there exists a relationship of co-integration between the 
dependent and explanatory variables (see Appendix, table A2). 
Table 3 gives the results of the regression analyses. For equation 
(1), it can be seen that the dependent and explanatory variables are 
statistically significantly correlated: the estimated value of the 
coefficient of C/Y, i.e. β, is 0.213. For the analysis using equation (2), 
the estimated value of β is still significant, but it decreases to 0.099. 
Even so, for equation (2), the estimated value of β is still greater than 
that of γ (0.028), i.e. the coefficient of (T+B)/Y, although precisely how 
significant is this difference in the coefficients requires further   Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience 275 
investigations. On the whole, these regression results indicate the vital 
role of the banking sector in promoting capital accumulation. Elsewhere 
in Lo and Li (2011), it is found that capital accumulation – or, more 
specifically, capital deepening – has been the main driving force behind 
Chinese industrialization and economic growth over the reform era, 
mostly in the form of promoting technological progress and 
productivity growth. It is reasonable to judge that the Chinese financial 
system has been conducive to promoting financial deepening, and 
thereby productive efficiency, of the economy. 
 
Table 3 – Regression analyses: finance and productive investment, 1978-
2010 
 
  Equation (1) Equation (2)
α 
0.154*** 
(0.030)
0.227*** 
(0.037)
β 
0.213*** 
(0.034)
0.099* 
（0.050）
γ 
0.028*** 
（0.010）
Observations-adj. 32 32
R
2-adj.  0.564 0.677
F-statistic  40.438 29.398
Prob. (F-statistic)  0.000 0.000
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors; ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
The positive role of Chinese finance in promoting economic 
development must be weighed against its negative effect in causing severe 
fluctuations, however. As is also shown in figure 2, the growth of both 
investment and bank credits exhibits severe fluctuations over the reform 
era. The annual growth rate of investment, in particular, could reach levels 
as low as 2% (in 1981) and 4% (in 1997) and as high as 37% (in 1985) and 
56% (in 1993). Given that the main sources of finance for productive 276   PSL Quarterly Review 
investment have been bank loans, it should be reasonable to infer that the 
conduct of Chinese banks has tended to be excessively unstable. They have 
tended to oscillate between excessive expansions and contractions, and 
such conduct must indicate some specific character of their institutional 
arrangements. In fact, state banks have tended to be even more unstable in 
conduct than non-state banks. As is shown in figure 3, throughout the 
reform era the growth of bank loans provided by state banks fluctuates far 
more severely than that of the banking sector as a whole. 
 
Figure 3 – Annual growth of total outstanding bank loans by state banks 
(CSB) and by the sector as a whole (C) 
 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook and China Financial Yearbook, various issues. 
 
In this connection, the specific character of the Chinese system of 
government controls and regulations over the banks is of note. In a 
nutshell, the system has been excessively tough by international 
standards. The exercise of administrative controls has persisted. The use   Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience 277 
of the credit plan was frequent in the first half of the reform era. This 
practice formally stopped in 1998, but the government still has 
administrative means to control the total credit volumes. Meanwhile, the 
regulatory framework (which has focused on applying versions of Basel) 
was first established in the 1994-1995 banking reform, but it has become 
functional only gradually after 1998. After a transitional period for 
commercializing state banks and replenishing their capital, by around 
2007, the regulatory framework became fully functional. The regulations 
over the banks (especially state banks) have been tougher than Basel, e.g. 
they mostly needed to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of more than 
12% even in the years 2008-2010, when the government tried hard to 
encourage credit expansion and other expansionary practices. There have 
also been severe restrictions on financial innovations, especially with 
respect to the securitization of bank assets and the involvement of banks 
in derivatives issuing and trading. 
The significance of the tougher-than-usual system of bank controls 
and regulations is that it appears to be in match with the unstable conduct 
of the banks. The excessive fluctuations caused by the banks have to be 
curbed by tough government measures. Unless the banks can exercise 
sufficient self-restraints to avoid excessive expansions and contractions, a 
direction which they seem to have been heading towards thanks to the 
reforms, the government regulations and even outright administrative 
controls need to be in place. This combination of the peculiar behaviour 
of the government and the banks has formed the famous “stop-go cycles” 
of the Chinese economy over the reform era, which have often been 
alluded to as evidence of the inefficiencies of the reformed financial 
system. Yet, this negative view has to be balanced by the positive 
performance of the system in promoting productive investment and 
thereby long-term economic development. A more comprehensive 
theoretical framework is needed for the assessment. 
 
 
3. An assessment: broadening the vision 
 
The Chinese experience as depicted in the preceding section is a case 278   PSL Quarterly Review 
of finance and development in the context of a mixed economic system, 
i.e. a system of (increasing) market competition cum (retaining) public 
ownership and control.  Assessing the experience needs to take into 
consideration a relevant debate in the “economics of transition.” On one 
side of the debate is the theory of the soft budget constraint, which 
predicts a one-sided, expansionary instinct of financial institutions that 
are not purely private. Ownership reforms, even complete privatization of 
all public firms including the banks, are claimed to be necessary for 
avoiding the instability and inefficiency caused by the mixed system 
(Kornai, 1990; Kornai et al., 2003). On the other side of the debate is the 
theory of control lost, which focuses on the relative speeds of capability 
development of the government-regulator versus the financial 
institutions. For maintaining macroeconomic stability, and promoting 
long-term economic development, the development of the system of 
controls and regulations needs to keep in pace with the market reforms of 
the banks (Potres, 1989; Yang, 1996). 
The second story seems to be more convincing in explaining the 
Chinese reality. As indicated earlier, throughout the reform era, the 
Chinese economy has experienced a number of “stop-go cycles,” or 
fluctuations between excessive expansions and contractions. These cycles 
have been a product of the joint efforts of the government and financial 
institutions. Nevertheless, it is not the case that government efforts have 
been solely responsible for the contractions and the conduct of the banks 
being solely responsible for the expansions. There was actually a 
prolonged period of time, roughly in the second half of the 1990s, when 
the commercialized state banks exhibited a strong inclination towards 
contracting credit provision – which was an important cause of the 
problem of deflation in the Chinese economy during this period (Lo and 
Zhang, 2011). And the unprecedented credit expansion in 2008-2010 was 
clearly a government-initiated phenomenon, in response to the condition 
of demand deficiency caused by the worldwide economic recession. 
Nor are “stop-go cycles” necessarily no more than a symptom of 
inefficiency. It is clear that a key presumption of the theory of the soft 
budget constraint is that a financial system that is in line with principles 
of the market is normally stable, and comparatively efficient in the   Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience 279 
allocative sense. This is a key tenet of the mainstream doctrines of 
financial liberalization. In contrast, Post Keynesian economics argues that 
financial instability is the normalcy of the market economy, and the 
importance of finance lies mainly in promoting productive efficiency 
(Arestis, 2004; Dullien, 2009; Kregel and Burlamaqui, 2005). 
Existing formal analyses of the Chinese experience of finance and 
development have mostly followed the mainstream doctrines. And their 
analytical findings have tended to give rise to negative views on the 
experience. The typical conclusions are either that the financial system 
has made an insignificant contribution to economic development, or that 
it could have made a better contribution had it been more completely 
reformed in line with the principles of the market (Aziz and Duenwald, 
2002; Boyreau-Debray, 2003; García-Herrero et al., 2006; Hao, 2006). 
Meanwhile, there have also emerged a relatively small number of studies 
that seek to study the Chinese experience with the assistance of 
alternative theories. These typically followed two different routes: either 
by drawing on the Keynesian-Schumpeterian theory of endogenous 
finance, where finance impacts the economy by creating credit “out of 
nothing” (Herr, 2010), or by resorting to the argument of structuralist 
development economics that the market cannot automatically deliver 
development, and positing that Chinese state banks despite all the market 
reforms have continued to embody both commercial and developmental 
attributes (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003).  
It seems true that, in view of our earlier depiction of the reality, both 
of these bodies of work might contain elements of truth but remain partial 
stories. To construct a convincing synthesis one needs to broaden the 
theoretical vision and take into consideration the key empirical stylized 
facts. Our contention, based on the alternative theories reviewed above 
and the stylized facts depicted in the previous section, is that there might 
exist a relationship of trade-off between the two types of efficiency, and 
between short-term stability and long-term development. And the effect 
of a particular financial system depends, in the first place, on the 
appropriate match or otherwise between the institutional arrangements of 
the market entities and the system of government controls and 
regulations. 280   PSL Quarterly Review 
Viewed this way, the experience seems to suggest that the Chinese 
financial system has been an amplified validation of the famous 
Minskyan financial instability hypothesis. In other words, compared with 
the notional market economy, Chinese finance has carried an amplified 
tendency towards financial instability. This is because the market entities, 
i.e. the state banks, have continued to embody both commercial and 
developmental attributes – as is explained by the theory of the soft budget 
constraint. Hence, it requires a tougher-than-usual system of government 
controls and regulations to curb the excessive fluctuations caused by the 
market entities. It needs discretionary government intervention in the 
form of a combination of, and balance between, regulations and 
administrative controls.
2 
The moral of the Minskyan financial instability hypothesis concerns 
more than short-term stability. The underlying theory in fact focuses on 
the interaction between finance and productive investment, and, as such, 
it is also of fundamental importance for the concern of long-term 
economic development (Palley, 2010). Accordingly, in the Chinese 
experience, controls and regulations are not just aimed at creating ceilings 
and floors to constrain the conduct of financial institutions. They are also 
needed for actively promoting productive investment, whilst containing 
instability. This need is evident not only in times of economic stagnation, 
such as what happened in China in the periods 1998-2001 (the time of the 
East Asian financial crisis) and 2008-2010 (the time of worldwide 
recession), but also in the main part of the rest of the reform era when the 
process of industrialization requires the necessary financial sources for 
capital deepening. 
But what makes the appropriate match between government 
intervention and the institutional arrangements of the financial system? 
What are the necessary conditions within which the working of this 
particular system has had, on balance, a significantly positive effect in 
                                                             
2 Excessive fluctuations often lead to allocative inefficiency. At times of excessive credit 
expansion, inefficient firms or projects could still receive supports from the financial 
sector. At times of excessive credit contraction, in contrast, even efficient firms or 
projects could not get hold of the necessary financial resources. These appear to be what 
have happened in China from time to time over the reform era.   Financial governance and economic development: making sense of the Chinese experience 281 
terms of maintaining short-term stability and promoting long-term 
development? To answer these questions requires studying more than the 
evolution of the financial system. It requires an adequate study of the 
overall process of Chinese economic transformation, particularly the 
main characteristics of the path of economic development and the role of 
finance therein. This paper is unable to offer anything in this regard. 
What we can do is to provide some pointers for further investigations, 
concerning our immediate concerns over the necessary conditions for the 
appropriate match. Discernibly, there are two key conditions. One 
condition is that the real economy is on a high-performing or fast-growth 
path, so that the banks will tend to be on the expansionary side and focus 
on supporting productive investment rather than asset price bubbles. 
Another condition is capital controls, i.e. limitations on capital flights and 
dollarization, so that even with the tough banking regulation and controls 
– and even at times of slowdown in real economic growth – the banks 
cannot avoid getting back to support productive investment. These 
conditions seem to have prevailed throughout the reform era. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Despite fundamental market reforms, the Chinese financial system 
has remained a mixed system. Today, there still exist strong market-
supplanting elements in the system. These include discretionary 
government intervention, the predominance of state banks in the sector, 
and the behavioural inclination of the banks towards causing excessive 
fluctuations. From the perspectives of the mainstream doctrines of 
financial liberalization, this system is easily judged to be entailing serious 
allocative inefficiencies. Nevertheless, such views might be partial. The 
system can be viewed favourably from alternative theoretical 
perspectives, in terms of promoting productive efficiency.  
This paper argues that the actual experience does seem to indicate 
that, hitherto, the gains in productive efficiency have more than 
compensated for the losses in allocative efficiency. This judgement helps to 
make sense of the Chinese anomaly that a seemingly inefficient financial 282   PSL Quarterly Review 
system has co-existed with the outstanding performance of financial 
deepening and economic development over the reform era. Further 
investigations will be needed to ascertain the conditions within which the 
working of the financial system has, on balance, made a significantly 
positive contribution to short-term stability and long-term development. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Outline of the Structural-Institutional Evolution of the 
Chinese Financial System 
 
  Structural Changes  Institutional Changes 
1979-1984 
Before 1979, all financial 
resources in the economy were 
centrally allocated by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC).  
In the period 1979-1984, the 
system was transformed into a 
two-tier structure, with the 
establishment of the “Big 
Four” specialized state-owned 
commercial banks and the PBC 
giving up all commercial 
activities. 
These “Big Four” state-owned 
specialized commercial banks 
were granted some incentives 
and autonomy to carry out their 
commercial activities. 
Before 1979, all the financial 
institutions in China were no more 
than administrative divisions of 
the economic hierarchy of the 
government, under the direct 
management of the People’s Bank 
of China (PBC) and/or the 
Ministry of Finance. 
In 1979, the Agricultural Bank of 
China was re-established, the 
Bank of China was separated out 
from the PBC, and the People’s 
Construction Bank of China was 
separated out from the Ministry of 
Finance. In 1984, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China 
was established to take over the 
PBC’s commercial activities. 
1985-1992 
In the period 1985-1992, the 
system was transformed into a 
three-tier system: the PBC, the 
“Big Four”, and a large number 
of newly emerged joint-stock 
banks and regional banks. 
Along with the gradual 
liberalization of the banking 
sector, the development of 
other financial activities also 
began to take place during this 
period. In particular, the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges were established in 
1990. 
 
The PBC gradually developed a 
system of banking controls in this 
period. This system was 
composed of both administrative 
measures (e.g., credit plans) and 
standard regulations (e.g., reserve 
requirement ratios), which the 
PBC adopted in a discretionary 
way in relation to the 
macroeconomic conditions. 
The biggest of the third-tier 
financial institutions, the Bank of 
Communication, was a joint-stock 
bank with state institutions 
holding a majority share. 
1993-2001 
Three state policy banks – the 
National Development Bank, 
the Export-Import Bank, and 
the Agricultural Development 
Bank – were established in 
The PBC’s status as central bank 
was formally established by the 
Law of the People’s Bank of 
China in 1995.  
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1994 to take over the policy 
activities of the “Big Four”. 
The existing large number of 
urban credit co-operatives were 
transformed into urban co-
operative banks in 1996 (later 
renamed urban commercial 
banks). 
commercial banks, including the 
“Big Four”, was formally 
established by the Law of 
Commercial Banks in 1995. All 
these banks were required to be 
responsible for their own profits 
and losses. 
Four state-owned Asset 
Management Companies was 
established to take over a main 
part of the non-performing loans 
of the “Big Four”. 
The PBC turned to rely mainly on 
regulations in banking control, 
with a focus on the capital 
adequacy ratios.   
2002 and after 
Following China’s admission 
to the World Trade 
Organization in late 2011, the 
banking sector was gradually 
opened to foreign institutions. 
The opening process was 
completed by end of 2006. 
From then on, foreign banks 
became free to conduct all 
kinds of banking business in 
China. 
 
From 2004, the “Big Four” were 
transformed into shareholding 
ownership and were allowed to 
list part of their shares in the 
domestic and overseas stock 
markets. 
The PBC continued to rely mainly 
on regulations (reserves 
requirement ratios, capital 
adequacy ratios, etc.) in banking 
control, but also reverted to using 
some administrative means at 
times (e.g., using some forms of 
credit plans in 2010-2011). 
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Table 2 – Unit-root and cointegration tests for the regressions reported in 
table 3 
 
  Variables  ADF (without trend)
Dependent variables 
K
Y
  -0.143 
()
K
Y
   -4.569*** 
Explanatory variables
C
Y
  -1.103 
()
C
Y
   -4.496*** 
TB
Y

  -0.485 
()
TB
Y

 -5.801*** 
Equation (1)  EG  -1.773* 
Equation (2)  EG  -2.092** 
 
Note: Data are of the years 1978-2010, and the number of observations is 32. EG denotes 
the ADF of the residuals from the cointegration tests. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios; 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively. 